DUS sensors are designed so they can not easily be mounted upside down (include pin of 5 mm for thi

On 2 July, a DM-03 Protón-M/Blok dramatically crashed to the ground eads shares shortly after takeoff with three satellites positioning system GLONASS. Immediately came all kinds of rumors about the cause of failure, but eventually the commission of inquiry set up by the Russian space agency Roscosmos has confirmed today that the culprit was the incorrect eads shares placement of the angular rate sensors launcher (DUS), as already pointed some leaks.
The impact with the ground took place 32.682 seconds after takeoff because of an inadequate orientation of three of the six sensors DUS. These angular velocity sensors are part of the guiding system using gyroscopes BDG formed eads shares by three redundant units. Three DUS to control movement in the yaw axis and three in the pitch axis. The three sets of sensors DUS the yaw axis of each of the three BDG were mounted upside down, preventing the orientation eads shares of the rocket during ascent (if the fault had been located in only one of the platforms BDG, computer Proton have isolated the erroneous data and Proton could have reached orbit). Early reports pointed to the sensor eads shares wiring was installed in reverse polarity, but eventually it was found that three sensors which had been assembled eads shares upside down.
DUS sensors are designed so they can not easily be mounted upside down (include pin of 5 mm for this purpose), so the inquiry commission faulty installation eads shares simulated to test the viability of this theory. They found that only forcing and slightly damaging the structure was possible to place the DUS backwards, so that initially assumed that no coach in their right mind could be responsible for this fudge. To their surprise, when they recovered the remains of the crashed Proton DUS could see that they had the same mechanical damage that DUS installed backwards during testing. To install the DUS, the technician must enter through a small hatch in the pitcher with a diameter of just half a meter. The DUS have indicators to indicate the correct orientation for installation, but the platform on which they are installed have no corresponding hallmark. The rocket had been set up in late 2011 and had since been in storage waiting to be released. Proton four rockets that are currently waiting to be released has already been inspected and it was found that their respective DUS are positioned correctly. Anecdotally, Russian social networks are filled with conspiracy theories regarding this incident. According to one of these theories, Khrunichev rocket purposely sabotaged because he knew the GLONASS had a serious failure of construction and can not function properly, once in orbit (this theory forgets that the GLONASS are manufactured by another company, Reshetniov).
Rumors suggest that the culprit eads shares was a young faulty installation eads shares technician Khrunichev, eads shares who could face a prison sentence for negligence and damage to property belonging to the federal eads shares government. He also noted that his immediate superior and the engineer in charge of reviewing the quality eads shares of the facility accredited by signing the placement operation DUS (obviously not supposed to directly reviewed the technical work). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, announced that the three must undergo a polygraph test. Needless to say, the fault is not responsible for any technical, but the quality control system of Khrunichev, which has allowed such sloppy pass unnoticed. The Russian aerospace industry has been facing for years to a steady loss of professionals trained in the Soviet era that hampers their development. Low wages and the prospect of jail time if a mistake is not exactly the best incentives to attract young engineers and technicians. The private sector offers better prospects for young professionals, who know they will not end up before a judge even if, for example, break a bank. Policy Khrunichev-heads and other Russian aerospace eads shares companies-consisting shamelessly handwashing and point the finger at lowest link and helpless of the chain of command is not only cowardly, but counterproductive in the long term. Such a system is evil and goes against the most basic principles of management and teamwork. If anyone thinks that firing or putting them in prison for young technicians fix the problem, is completely wrong. Moreover, unlike other previous failures Proton, this time the stages